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A IS NOT A:' WASHINGTON'S UNCONSTITUTIONAL
LAW OF SINGLE-COUNT, SINGLE-DEFENDANT
INCONSISTENT VERDICTS IN STATE V. GOINS
Natasha Shekdar Black, M.S.
Abstract: In State v. Goins, Division I of the Washington State Court of Appeals upheld
inconsistent general and special verdicts on the same charge, even though the special verdict
finding negated an element of the crime. The Goins court reasoned that the United States
Supreme Court and the Washington State Supreme Court had previously upheld inconsistent
verdicts in various contexts because the verdicts could have been the result of jury lenity.
Therefore, overruling existing precedent, the Goins court upheld the inconsistent verdicts on
the ground that distinguishing the Goins context would be elevating form over substance. This
Note argues that the Gains decision is incorrect because the court failed to follow prior
precedent and instead extended inapplicable case law beyond its reach, thereby depriving the
defendant of his due process right to have the state prove all elements of the crime charged
beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, this Note proposes remedial measures that would direct at
least a mistrial in this context.
In the early morning of May 18, 2000, Matthew Goins went to Angela
Z's apartment.2 While there he tried to kiss Z, but she rebuffed him.3
They later fought.4 Goins claimed that Z attacked him, while Z said that
Goins tried to rape her.5 Z called the police,6 and Goins was arrested and
charged with second-degree assault with intent to commit indecent
liberties.' The crime of second degree assault with intent to commit
indecent liberties is not a statutory sex offense in Washington.8 However,
a felony committed with sexual motivation is a sex offense.9 Thus, in
order to make the crime a sex offense the prosecutor had to, and did,
I. "Aristotle posited three laws as basic to all valid thought: the law of identity, A is A; the law of
contradiction, A cannot be both A and not A; and the law of the excluded middle, A must be either A
or not A." THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, Logic 1603 (5th ed. 1993). This Note explores an
example of what Aristotle might label "contradiction."
2. State v. Goins, 113 Wash. App. 723, 726, 54 P.3d 723, 724 (2002). A petition for review has
been granted. State v. Goins, No. 73177-2 (Wash. granted April 29, 2003).
3. Goins, 113 Wash. App. at 726, 54 P.3d at 724.
4. Id. at 726, 54 P.3d at 724-25.
5. Id. at 727, 54 P.3d at 725.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 727-28, 54 P.3d at 725.
8. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030(38) (2002).
9. Id. § 9.94A.030(38)(c).
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separately charge that Goins acted with sexual motivation," even though
sexual motivation is a recognized element of second-degree assault with
intent to commit indecent liberties."' The jury found Goins guilty of
second-degree assault with intent to commit indecent liberties,' 2 but by
special verdict found that he did not act with sexual motivation.
3
On appeal, Goins argued that these verdicts were irreconcilably
inconsistent-no jury could have found that he acted both with and
without sexual motivation. 4 In State v. Goins,'5 Division I of the
Washington State Court of Appeals agreed. 16 Nevertheless, it upheld his
conviction. 7 Citing cases that protect the unreviewable exercise of jury
lenity, the court held that Goins could only have his guilty verdict
reviewed for sufficiency of the evidence. 8 This remedy is available to all
criminal defendants, without regard to any inconsistency in the verdict,
and presents a low standard: the reviewing court need only find sufficient
evidence presented at trial to permit a trier of fact to rationally reach a
guilty verdict.' 9 Because the appellate court concluded that the jury could
have believed Z's testimony, Goins' inconsistent verdicts stood.2 °
This Note argues that Division I of the Washington State Court of
Appeals incorrectly decided Goins because it failed to follow applicable
precedent and inappropriately extended prior case law beyond its scope,
thereby denying the defendant his constitutional right to have every
element of the crime charged proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Part I
sets forth the due process requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, presents an overview of jury verdicts, and explains the extent to
which criminal jury verdicts are reviewable. Part II summarizes U.S.
Supreme Court and Washington case law on inconsistent criminal
verdicts in the various contexts in which they appear. Part III details the
Goins decision. Part IV describes the Washington statute on inconsistent
verdicts in the civil context. Part V argues that the Goins decision was
10. Goins, 113 Wash. App. at 727-28, 54 P.3d at 725.
11. Id. at 729-30, 54 P.3d at 726.
12. Id. at 729, 54 P.3d at 726.
13. Id. at 726, 54 P.3d at 724.
14. Id. at 725, 54 P.3d at 724.
15. 113 Wash. App. 723, 54 P.3d 723 (2002).
16. Id. at 730, 54 P.3d at 726.
17. Id. at 725, 54 P.3d at 724.
18. Id. at 742, 54 P.3d at 733.
19. See infra Part I.C.
20. Goins, 113 Wash. App. at 743, 54 P.3d at 733.
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both unconstitutional and out of line with precedent, and recommends a
remedial framework. This Note concludes that under the due process
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and applicable
Washington case law on inconsistent verdicts, defendants in cases such
as Goins are entitled to at least a mistrial, and at most a judgment of
acquittal.
I. CONVICTIONS IN WASHINGTON JURY TRIALS MUST
RESULT FROM PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT
AND ARE SUBJECT TO LIMITED REVIEW
In order to obtain a conviction at trial, the state is required to prove
each element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.2' Juries in
Washington criminal trials return their verdicts through general and
special verdict forms.2 Once the jury returns its verdict, the verdict is
subject to limited review.23 The defendant may challenge the sufficiency
of the evidence for any conviction. 4 However, because of the
constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy,2 5 the state may not seek
review of an acquittal.26
A. The State Must Prove All Elements of a Crime Charged Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt
In In re Winship,27 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Due Process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. ' '28 The Court
cited two key considerations in upholding the requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal proceedings. First, the interests of
the accused are of "immense importance" because conviction may result
in loss of liberty and social stigma. 29 A high standard of proof reduces
21. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
22. WASH. SUP. CT. CRIM. R. 6.16(c).
23. See infra Part I.C.
24. United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 67 (1984). See State v. Salinas, 119 Wash. 2d 192, 201,
829 P.2d 1068, 1074 (1992).
25. See infra Part I.C.
26. Powell, 469 U.S. at 65.
27. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
28. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 (emphasis added).
29. Id. at 363.
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the risk of convictions based on factual error.3" Second, "use of the
reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command the respect and
confidence of the community in applications of the criminal law."
3'
Without this respect and confidence, the "moral force of the criminal
law" would be diluted by doubt.32 Following the lead of Winship, the
Washington State Supreme Court and the Washington State Legislature
both require proof of every element of a crime charged beyond a
reasonable doubt.33 Further, the state must also prove all allegations on
special verdict forms beyond a reasonable doubt. 4
B. Special and General Jury Verdicts in Washington
Washington juries may return both general and special verdicts. A
verdict is a jury's finding or decision on the factual issues of a case. 35 A
general verdict is a verdict by which the jury finds in favor of one party
or the other,36 such as when a jury finds the defendant guilty or not
guilty.37 A special verdict 38 is a verdict in which a jury gives a written
finding for a specific question of fact.39 For example, when a prosecutor
in Washington charges a defendant with a crime and there is sufficient
evidence for a jury to find that the crime was committed with sexual
motivation, the prosecutor is statutorily required to file a special
allegation of sexual motivation.40 In such cases, if the jury finds the
defendant guilty of the principal offense, it must return a special verdict
as to whether the defendant committed the crime with a sexual
motivation.4' Under Washington law, any felony with a finding of sexual
30. Id. at 364.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. State v. Odom, 83 Wash. 2d 541, 545-46, 520 P.2d 152, 155 (1974); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 10.58.020 (2002).
34. State v. Pam, 98 Wash. 2d 748, 754-55, 659 P.2d 454, 457-58 (1983).
35. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1554 (7th ed. 1999).
36. Id. at 1555.
37. See WASH. SUP. CT. CRIM. R. 6.16(c).
38. Courts also call special verdicts or the findings returned by special verdicts "special
interrogatories" or "special findings." See e.g., State v. Hurley, 4 Wash. App. 781, 781, 483 P.2d
1274, 1274 (1971) (using the term "special interrogatory"); State v. McNeal, 145 Wash. 2d 352, 356,
37 P.3d 280, 282 (2002) (using the term "special finding").
39. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 35, at 1554.
40. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.835(l) (2002). The special allegation is not required for crimes
that are inherently sexual offenses. Id.
41. Id. § 9.94A.835(2).
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motivation is a sex offense,42 and anyone convicted of a sex offense must
register as a sex offender.43 Indeed, sexual motivation is one of the
primary situations in which a criminal jury must decide a special verdict
in Washington.44
C. Permissible Scope of Review of Jury Verdicts
Criminal defendants can seek to have guilty verdicts reviewed for
sufficiency of the evidence.4 5 For this review, the appellate court
determines "whether the evidence adduced at trial could support any
rational determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,"'46 viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the state.4 ' The court reviews the
sufficiency of the evidence independently for each count on which the
defendant was convicted. 8 Courts seldom examine jury verdicts beyond
sufficiency of the evidence because of the need for finality in the
criminal process. 9
The state, however, may not seek review of an acquittal.50 The Double
Jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall
"be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb."'" A defendant is "in jeopardy" once the jury is impaneled and
sworn, 52 or when the court begins to hear evidence in a bench trial. 3
Since the U.S. Supreme Court decision in United States v. Ball5 4 in 1896,
it has been clear that the state may not prosecute a defendant twice for
42. Id. § 9.94A.030(38)(c).
43. Id. § 9A.44.130(l).
44. Another common situation when the court will give the jury a special verdict form is when the
state alleges that a defendant or an accomplice was armed with a deadly weapon during the
commission of the principal crime. Id. § 9.94A.602. If the jury finds that the defendant was armed,
the defendant will face a sentence enhancement. Id. § 9.94A.510(3) (for firearms); id.
§ 9.94A.510(4) (for deadly weapons other than firearms).
45. United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 67 (1984). See State v. Salinas, 119 Wash. 2d 192, 201,
829 P.2d 1068, 1074 (1992). There are other questions that criminal defendants may raise on appeal,
but only sufficiency of the evidence review is relevant to this Note.
46. Powell, 469 U.S. at 67.
47. Salinas, 119 Wash. 2d at 201, 829 P.2d at 1074.
48. Powell, 469 U.S. at 67.
49. Id.
50. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957).
51. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
52. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 36 (1978).
53. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975).
54. 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
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the same offense.55 Therefore, once the jury has rendered a verdict of
acquittal, the state cannot appeal or challenge the verdict.
56
II. INCONSISTENT VERDICTS: CAUSES, CONTEXTS, AND
RESOLUTIONS
When one of the jury's general or special verdicts contradicts another
of its general or special verdicts, the verdicts are inconsistent. 57 If the
verdicts can be liberally construed in a manner that makes them
consistent, courts will hold that there is no irreconcilable inconsistency. 8
The commonly recognized causes of inconsistent verdicts are mistake or
confusion, jury lenity, and compromise. 9 Inconsistent verdicts arise in
three contexts. First, inconsistent verdicts can occur when multiple
defendants are tried jointly, and the acquittal of one defendant is
inconsistent with the conviction of the other.6" Second, inconsistent
verdicts can arise when one defendant is tried on multiple charges in a
single trial and there is an inconsistency between the general verdicts, or
between a special verdict on one charge and a general verdict on another
charge.6" In both of these situations, courts will uphold the inconsistent
verdicts as long as the conviction is supported by sufficient evidence
because in each case the jury may have acquitted the defendant by
exercising jury lenity.62 In the third context, inconsistent verdicts arise
when a single defendant is tried on a single charge, and the special
verdict on that charge is inconsistent with the general verdict on the same
charge.63 Prior to State v. Goins, Washington courts facing this last
situation had reversed the conviction that was inconsistent with a special
verdict on the same count and granted a mistrial.64
55. Id. at 669.
56. United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65 (1984).
57. See infra Part I LA.
58. See infra Part 11.A.
59. See infra Part 11.8.
60. See infra Part I I.C.1.
61. See infra Part I1.C.2.
62. See infra Parts II.C.I, II.C.2.
63. See infra Part II.C.3.
64. A year prior to the Goins decision, Division I1 of the Washington Court of Appeals decided
State v. Holmes, which, in dicta, explicitly questioned granting a mistrial when the conviction was
inconsistent with a special verdict on the same count. See 106 Wash. App. 775, 781 n.2, 24 P.3d
1118, 1122 n.2 (2001); see also infra notes 165-70 and accompanying text. It was not until the
Goins decision that there was a contrary holding. See infra Part 11.C.3.
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A. Potentially Inconsistent Verdicts are Deemed Consistent Unless
They Cannot be Reconciled
In Washington, inconsistent verdicts exist only when the verdicts
cannot be construed to be consistent.65 When a special verdict is
amenable to multiple interpretations, the court will adopt the
interpretation that supports the general verdict.66 Yet, even when two
verdicts are logically inconsistent, it may be possible to reconcile them
by liberal construction." Once reconciled, the two potentially
inconsistent verdicts are deemed consistent.
For example, in State v. Peerson,6" Division I of the Washington State
Court of Appeals upheld a conviction because it was able to reconcile
arguably inconsistent verdicts through liberal construction.69 In Peerson,
the defendant was charged with two counts of aggravated first-degree
murder."v For each murder charge, the court gave the jury an aggravating
circumstance special verdict form that asked if the murder was
committed in the course of a common scheme or plan.7' By definition, a
common scheme or plan must result in more than one death in order for
the jury to find that the aggravating circumstance existed. 2 However,
although the jury found that only one of the murders was committed as
part of a common scheme or plan,73 it convicted the defendant of both
counts of aggravated first-degree murder.74 The Peerson court was able
to reconcile these verdicts in two ways.75 First, it reasoned that the jury
could have understood the instructions to mean that a common scheme or
plan was not technically complete until both the victims were dead.76
Second, the court noted that the instructions allowed the jury to convict
65. State v. Kimball, 14 Wash. App. 951, 954, 546 P.2d 1217, 1219 (1976) (citing State v.
Robinson, 84 Wash. 2d 42, 45-46, 523 P.2d 1192, 1195 (1974)).
66. Robinson, 84 Wash. 2d at 45, 523 P.2d at 1195 (citing McCorkle v. Mallory, 30 Wash. 632,
71 P. 186(1903)).
67. Id.
68. 62 Wash. App. 755, 816 P.2d 43 (1991).
69. Id. at 766, 816 P.2d at 50.
70. Id. at 758, 816 P.2d at 46. Peerson was also charged with two counts of first-degree assault,
which are not relevant to this Note. Id.
71. Id. at 764, 816 P.2d at 49.
72. Id. at 765, 816 P.2d at 50.
73. Id. at 764, 816 P.2d at 49-50.
74. Id. at 758, 816 P.2d at 46.
75. Id. at 766, 816 P.2d at 50.
76. Id.
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on an alternative aggravating circumstance. 7' Therefore, the Peerson
court upheld both convictions through liberal construction."
B. Causes of Inconsistent Verdicts
Inconsistent verdicts typically arise from mistake or confusion, jury
lenity, or compromise. In cases involving potential jury mistake or
confusion, the court will find the inconsistent verdicts reconcilable. In
State v. Burke,79 for example, the state alleged accomplice liability for
two co-defendants in a crime involving only one weapon. 8 The trial
court instructed the jury that if either defendant possessed a weapon, both
were legally deemed to have possessed the weapon.8' The jury found by
special verdict that one of the defendants, but not both, was armed with a
weapon.82 To reconcile the verdicts, the appellate court reasoned that the
jury might not have understood the legal fiction of constructive
possession.83 Because the jury may have misunderstood the court's
instruction, the court construed the special verdict to be consistent with
the general verdict.84
Another cause of inconsistent verdicts is the exercise of jury lenity.85
Jury lenity is the jury's unreviewable power to refuse to enforce the
law.86 Courts and commentators refer to this power alternatively as jury
nullification, jury mercy, jury lawlessness, jury justice, and jury veto
power.87 The U.S. Supreme Court has endorsed the exercise of jury lenity
as "recognition of the jury's historic function, in criminal trials, as a
check against arbitrary or oppressive exercises of power by the Executive
Branch."88 Although the Court has recognized that through jury lenity the
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. 90 Wash. App. 378, 952 P.2d 619 (1998).
80. Id. at 382, 952 P.2d at 62 1.
81. Id. at 383, 952 P.2d at 621.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 387, 952 P.2d at 623.
84. Id. at 388, 952 P.2d at 623.
85. United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65 (1984).
86. Id.
87. CLAY S. CONRAD, JURY NULLIFICATION, THE EVOLUTION OF A DOCTRINE 6 (1998).
88. Powell, 469 U.S. at 65. Despite this judicial characterization ofjury lenity as a benign power,
the jury has historically been able to use this power to the detriment of criminal defendants. See Eric
L. Muller, The Hobgoblin of Little Minds? Our Foolish Law oJInconsistent Verdicts, Ill HARV. L.
REv. 771, 803-06 (1998).
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jury is exercising a power it does not have,89 and is "return[ing] a verdict
of not guilty for impermissible reasons," 90 the Court has maintained that
inconsistent verdicts possibly resulting from jury lenity are not subject to
review on that ground.9' The exercise of jury lenity has led one observer
to note that the phenomenon is "not only unpunishable, but irreviewable
and absolute."92
Jury lenity has a similar effect in Washington. In State v. Ng,93 for
example, the jury acquitted the defendant of thirteen counts of felony-
murder, but convicted him of the thirteen underlying robbery felonies.94
The court decided that because the defendant had admitted to the
killings, the jury was inconsistent in acquitting him of the felony-
murders while convicting him of the robberies. 95 The court attributed the
inconsistency to jury lenity.96
Finally, inconsistent verdicts can arise through compromise when a
deadlocked jury negotiates some mix of convictions and acquittals. For
example, in a conspiracy charge, one half of the jury may think both
defendants are guilty beyond a reasonable doubt while the other half may
think both are innocent.97 Instead of deadlocking, the jury may decide to
compromise by convicting one defendant and acquitting the other.
According to one commentator, compromise is not within the power of
the jury and undermines the integrity of the judicial system.98 However,
because it is not possible to accurately separate inconsistent verdicts that
result from compromise and those that result from jury lenity, the same
umbrella that protects jury lenity also shades compromise verdicts from
appellate review.99 Therefore, although compromise verdicts potentially
eviscerate the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt' and the
89. Powell, 469 U.S. at 66 (citing Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 (1932)).
90. Id. at 63 (quoting Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 346 (1981)) (internal quotations omitted).
91. Id.
92. CONRAD, supra note 87, at 9.
93. 110 Wash. 2d 32, 750 P.2d 632 (1988).
94. Id. at 36, 750 P.2d at 634.
95. Id. at 45, 750 P.2d at 639.
96. Id. at 48, 750 P.2d at 640. In Washington, the jury's power of nullification is intact although
the defendant is not entitled to an instruction informing the jury of its power. State v. Bonisisio, 92
Wash. App. 783, 794, 964 P.2d 1222, 1229 (1998).
97. Hypothetical created by author.
98. See Muller, supra note 88, at 784.
99. See, e.g., Steckler v. United States, 7 F.2d 59, 60 (2d Cir. 1925).
100. See supra Part l.A.
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requirement of unanimity, 1' they are not reviewable when the verdicts
could also be interpreted as the product of jury lenity.1
2
C. Inconsistent Verdicts Arise in Three Contexts
Inconsistent verdicts can arise whenever the jury is asked to return
more than a single verdict. This happens in three contexts. First, an
inconsistent verdict can arise when two defendants are tried together, and
one of the defendants is acquitted. In the second context, there is only
one defendant, but an inconsistency exists on the multiple counts charged
against the defendant. 0 3 In these two contexts, both federal and
Washington jurisprudence dictate that sufficiency of the evidence review
is adequate to determine the validity of the verdicts, and that
considerations of jury lenity limit further review.0 4 In the final context,
there is only one count charged against one defendant, but the
inconsistency arises when general and special verdicts on that count
conflict. 0 5 Prior to Goins, Washington courts reversed the conviction in
this context and granted a mistrial.'0 6
1. Multiple-Defendant Inconsistent Verdicts
A defendant cannot challenge his or her conviction on the ground that
it is inconsistent with the acquittal of a co-defendant.0 7 In multiple-
defendant cases, an inconsistent verdict may arise when the jury acquits
one defendant but convicts the other in a case where logic requires that
all defendants receive the same verdict.0 8 Appellate review of multiple-
defendant inconsistent verdicts is limited to determining whether the
conviction was supported by sufficient evidence and resulted from a fair
trial. 09
101. WASH. SUP. CT. CRIM. R. 6.16(2).
102. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 279 (1943) (citing Dunn v. United States,
284 U.S. 390 (1932)) ("Whether the jury's verdict was the result of carelessness or compromise or
[nullification] ... is immaterial. Juries may indulge in precisely such motives or vagaries.").
103. See infra Part I1.C.2.
104. See infra Parts I I.C.I., I I.C.2.
105. See infra Part II.C.3.
106. See infra Part II.C.3.
107. Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 348 (1981).
108. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 279 (1943).
109. Rivera, 454 U.S. at 348.
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In Harris v. Rivera,"' three defendants were each charged with crimes
arising from an apartment robbery." The U.S. Supreme Court conceded
that either all three defendants should have been acquitted or all three
defendants should have been convicted." 2 However, the Court held that a
convicted defendant cannot challenge the conviction on the ground that it
is inconsistent with the acquittal of a co-defendant." 3  Citing
considerations of lenity, the Court held that such a conviction is
constitutional as long as it is supported by sufficient evidence and
resulted from a fair trial." 4
2. Multiple-Count, Single-Defendant Inconsistent Verdicts
Most jurisprudence on inconsistent verdicts has developed in the
multiple-count, single-defendant context. Such inconsistencies can arise
between general verdicts on multiple counts,' '5 or between the general
verdict on one count and a special verdict on another count.'" ' There is
no federal constitutional right to a consistent verdict in a criminal trial
involving inconsistent verdicts for a single defendant charged with
multiple counts.'" Similarly, there is also no such state constitutional
right, as Washington courts have followed the U.S. Supreme Court and
held that such inconsistent verdicts may have resulted from jury lenity." 8
Therefore, Washington courts have reasoned that inconsistent multiple-
count, single-defendant verdicts are not subject to reversal simply
because they are inconsistent.'" Both U.S. Supreme Court and
Washington precedents limit review of multiple-count, single-defendant
inconsistent verdicts to the sufficiency of the evidence on the count for
which the defendant was convicted.
20
110. 454 U.S. 339 (1981).
I11. Id. at 340.
112. Although this was a non-jury trial, the Court found the reasoning was parallel as between
jury and non-jury trials, and that the judge, like the jury, may exercise lenity. Id. at 346-48.
113. Id. at 348.
114. Id. at 344.
115. See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 60 (1984); State v. Ng, I 10 Wash. 2d 32, 36,
750 P.2d 632, 634 (1988).
116. See, e.g., State v. McNeal, 145 Wash. 2d 352,356, 37 P.3d 280, 282 (2002).
117. Powell, 469 U.S. at 69.
118. See, e.g., Ng, I10 Wash. 2d at 48, 750 P.2d at 640.
119. Id.
120. Powell, 469 U.S. at 67; Ng, I 10 Wash. 2d at 48, 750 P.2d at 640.
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In United States v. Powell,121 the U.S. Supreme Court held that
defendants who challenge inconsistent multiple-count verdicts are
entitled only to a sufficiency of the evidence review.122 The inconsistency
in Powell arose when the jury acquitted the defendant of an underlying
felony-conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute-but
convicted her of using a telephone to facilitate that felony. 123 Because
proof of possession was an element of the facilitation charge, the
defendant's conviction on facilitation was inconsistent with her acquittal
on possession."' Although the Court noted that the potentially
conflicting results might indicate that the jury failed to express its true
conclusions, it reasoned that such results do not necessarily show that the
jury did not find guilt with respect to the conviction.
25
While the Court acknowledged that some error must have occurred to
cause the inconsistent verdicts, it reasoned that the inconsistency could
favor either the state or the defendant. 26 As the Court explained,
although it was possible that the conviction was the incorrect result-as
the defendant claimed-the acquittal, instead, could have been the
incorrect result. The jury could have properly reached its verdict of
conviction on the facilitation, and then improperly-through mistake,
confusion, or lenity-reached its result on the underlying felony.'27 The
Court noted that the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy
prohibited the state from challenging an acquittal, 2 and reasoned that it
would be "hardly satisfactory" to allow the defendant to challenge the
inconsistency when the state could not. 29 The Court held that the
possibility of jury lenity, along with the government's inability to invoke
review of the acquittal on the ground that it favored the defendant, made
the verdicts unreviewable. 30 Although sufficiency of the evidence
review determines only whether the evidence presented at trial could
support each conviction when considered independently from the
verdicts on other counts, the Court cited the need for finality in criminal
121. 469 U.S. 57 (1984).
122. Id. at 67.
123. Id. at 60.
124. Id. The government conceded the inconsistency for the purposes of review. Id. at 61 n.5.
125. Id. at 64-65 (citing Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 (1932)).
126. Id. at 65.
127. Id.
128. Id. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text; see also CONRAD, supra note 87, at 7-9.
129. Powell, 469 U.S. at 65.
130. Id. at 66.
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matters and concluded that such review was a sufficient safeguard
against jury irrationality. 3 '
Washington law similarly requires only that sufficient evidence
support a single defendant's guilty verdict when the inconsistency arises
between an acquittal and a conviction because such an inconsistency can
be attributed to jury lenity. 132 In Ng, for example, an inconsistency arose
when the jury convicted the defendant of first-degree robbery on thirteen
counts but acquitted him of felony murder on thirteen counts. 33 Because
the defendant did not dispute that the killings occurred, 34 he argued that
the guilty verdicts on the robberies required that the jury also find him
guilty of the felony murders. 35 Therefore, the defendant reasoned that
the convictions on first-degree robbery were void because they were
inconsistent with the acquittals on felony murder. 36 The Washington
State Supreme Court, however, upheld the verdicts, holding that
concerns with second-guessing a jury's verdict of acquittal and
considerations of jury lenity dictated that the verdicts be affirmed.' 37 In
such cases, the Ng court held that sufficiency of the evidence review is
an adequate remedy.
38
The Washington State Supreme Court has also held that consistency
between multiple convictions is not required as long as sufficient
evidence supports each guilty verdict.'39 In State v. McNeal, 40 the
defendant was charged with vehicular homicide and vehicular assault
after he caused a fatal car accident.' 4' A blood test showed evidence of
methamphetamine. 42 To prove vehicular assault, the state had to show
131. Id. at 67.
132. State v. Ng, 110 Wash. 2d 32, 48, 750 P.2d 632, 640 (1988).
133. Id. at 36, 750 P.2d at 634. The court "instructed the jury that it could find Ng guilty of first
degree robbery as a lesser included offense to felony murder." Id. An offense is a lesser-included
offense when "each of the elements of the lesser offense [is] a necessary element of the offense
charged' and "the evidence in the case... support[s] an inference that the lesser crime was
committed." State v. Berlin, 133 Wash. 2d 541, 550, 947 P.2d 700, 704 (1997) (citing State v.
Workman, 90 Wash. 2d 433, 447-48, 584 P.2d 382, 385 (1978)) (internal quotations omitted)
(emphasis in original).
134. Ng, 110 Wash. 2d at 47-48, 750 P.2d at 640.
135. Id. at 45, 750 P.2d at 639.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 48, 750 P.2d at 640.
138. Id.
139. State v. McNeal, 145 Wash. 2d 352, 357-59, 37 P.3d 280, 282-83 (2002).
140. 145 Wash. 2d 352, 37 P.3d 280 (2002).
141. Id. at 355, 37 P.3d at 282.
142. Id. at 356, 37 P.3d at 282.
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that the defendant operated his car while "under the influence of
drugs." 14 3 For the vehicular homicide charge, the jury was asked by
special verdict to find whether the defendant was "operating the motor
vehicle ... while under the influence of drugs.' The jury answered no
to the special verdict form, yet convicted the defendant on all counts.
45
In effect, the jury found that the defendant both was and was not under
the influence of drugs at the time of the accident. The McNeal court held
that where there is an inconsistency between guilty verdicts on two
different counts, and the inconsistency arises between general and special
verdicts or between two general verdicts, the court will review each
conviction independently for sufficiency of the evidence.' 46 Therefore,
the Washington State Supreme Court in McNeal upheld the vehicular
assault conviction because there was sufficient evidence to support it. 147
Justice Sanders' dissent in McNeal, however, stressed the distinction
between the inconsistent verdicts in McNeal, arising between multiple
convictions, and the inconsistent verdicts in Powell and Ng, arising
between convictions and acquittals. 48 The dissent argued that jury lenity
cannot play a role when the jury convicts on all counts. 49 The McNeal
majority disagreed, noting that the defendant would have faced an
increased standard sentence had the jury found by special verdict that the
defendant was under the influence of drugs. 50 Further, the McNeal
majority reasoned that the jury may have understood the jury instructions
to mean that it could find guilt of vehicular assault on two separate
grounds: either that the defendant was under the influence of drugs, or
that the defendant operated a motor vehicle with disregard for the safety
of others. 5' The McNeal court reasoned that the jury could have thought
that finding guilt on the latter ground implied less culpability than
finding that he was under the influence of drugs.'52 Therefore, the court
143. Id.
144. Id. A special finding that the defendant was under the influence of drugs increases the
seriousness level of the underlying offense. Id. at 359 n.3, 37 P.3d at 284 n.3.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 359, 37 P.3d at 283-84.
147. Id. at 363, 37 P.3d at 286.
148. Id. at 365, 37 P.3d at 286 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 366, 37 P.3d at 287 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 359 n.3, 37 P.3d at 284 n.3.




held that considerations of jury lenity can exist even when the jury
convicts the defendant on all counts.
53
3. Single-Count, Single-Defendant Inconsistent Verdicts
Prior to the Washington State Court of Appeals Division I decision in
Goins,'54 Washington courts reversed the conviction of a single
defendant with a single charge when a jury returned a special verdict
negating an element of the crime charged. 55 Single-count, single-
defendant inconsistent verdicts arise where there is an inconsistency
between a general verdict and a special verdict on a single count. In State
v. Hurley,5 6 for example, a guilty robbery verdict was inconsistent with a
special verdict finding that the defendant was not armed with a deadly
weapon."' The trial court's robbery instruction stated that to convict the
defendant, the jury had to find that the defendant was armed with a
deadly weapon at the time the robbery was committed. 5 8 Division III of
the Washington State Court of Appeals reasoned that under the trial
court's instructions, being armed with a deadly weapon was an element
of the robbery charge.'59 Thus, the appellate court reversed the
defendant's robbery conviction because the internal inconsistency
between the general and special verdicts was irreconcilable.
60
Similarly, in State v. Wedner,16' Division I of the Washington State
Court of Appeals reversed a defendant's conviction for second-degree
assault because the jury found by special verdict that the defendant was
not armed with a deadly weapon. 162 The jury had been instructed that to
convict the defendant of assault, the state had to prove that he was
armed. 63 Because of the irreconcilable internal inconsistency between
153. Id. at 359 n.3, 37 P.3d at 284 n.3.
154. See infra Part III for a discussion of the Goins decision.
155. State v. Wedner, 24 Wash. App. 346, 601 P.2d 950 (1979); State v. Hurley, 4 Wash. App.
781,483 P.2d 1274 (1971).
156. 4 Wash. App. 781, 483 P.2d 1274 (1971).
157. Id. at 783, 483 P.2d at 1275.
158. Id. at 782, 483 P.2d at 1275. The court noted that this was an inaccurate statement of the law,
but became the law of the case because there was no objection to the instruction. Id. at 783, 483 P.2d
at 1275.
159. Id. at 783, 483 P.2d at 1275. The court distinguished three prior cases in which being armed
with a deadly weapon was not an element of the crime charged. Id.
160. Id. at 784, 483 P.2d at 1276.
161. 24 Wash. App. 346, 601 P.2d 950 (1979).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 347, 601 P.2d at 951.
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the special verdict and the general verdict, the court voided the judgment
and granted a new trial.'64
Recently, Division II of the Washington State Court of Appeals
explicitly questioned the continuing vitality of Hurley and Wedner in
State v. Holmes. 65 The jury in Holmes convicted the defendant of first-
degree robbery, but found by special verdict that he was not armed with a
deadly weapon at the time of the crime-an element of robbery. 66 The
Holmes court upheld the conviction, holding that the verdicts were not
irreconcilably inconsistent. 67 The court explained that the trial court had
given the jury two different definitions of "deadly weapon" which made
it possible for the jury to find that the defendant was armed as defined in
the robbery instruction, but not armed for the deadly weapon
enhancement. 6 Although the court cited Hurley and Wedner as contrary
authority, 69 it did not reconcile them. The court simply noted that Hurley
and Wedner were decided when "inconsistent verdicts constituted
reversible error,"'' 71 thus questioning their authority and citing Ng for
support.
In sum, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that inconsistent verdicts
involving two defendants are attributable to considerations of jury lenity
and are not reversible purely because they are inconsistent. In the
multiple-count, single-defendant context, Washington law parallels
federal law and inconsistent verdicts are upheld out of concerns of jury
lenity. Washington courts will uphold convictions in both of these
situations if the convictions are supported by sufficient evidence-the
same level of review available for all criminal defendants. Prior to Goins,
however, a single defendant convicted inconsistently on a single count
was granted a mistrial.
164. Id. at 347, 601 P.2d at 950.
165. 106 Wash. App. 775, 781 n.2, 24 P.3d 1118, 1122 n.2 (2001).
166. Id. at 778, 24 P.3d at 1120.
167. Id. at 780, 24 P.3d at 1121.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 780-81,24 P.3d at 1121-22.
170. Id. at 781 n.2, 24 P.3d at 1122 n.2.
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III. IN STATE V. GOINS, DIVISION I OF THE WASHINGTON
STATE COURT OF APPEALS UPHELD IRRECONCILABLY
INCONSISTENT VERDICTS IN THE SINGLE-COUNT,
SINGLE-DEFENDANT CONTEXT
Matthew Goins and his friend Steve Haworth went out drinking in
May, 2000 and visited the victim's (Z) apartment. 7' Haworth went into
the bathroom and passed out.7 2 Z testified that Goins approached her and
tried to kiss her twice.'73 She said he retreated the first time when she
pushed him away, but the second time he forced her into the bedroom,
pinned her on the bed, and tried to lift up her shirt and touch her.'74 She
fought back and screamed.'75 Her screams roused Haworth who entered
the bedroom, at which point Goins fled.7 6 Later, Goins admitted that he
tried to kiss Z, and that he might have touched her shoulder. 177 But, he
said that Z unexpectedly punched him and he had to grab her to stop her
attack.'78 Although he admitted to pushing her on the bed, he said it was
an accident.'79
The state charged Goins with one count of second-degree assault with
intent to commit indecent liberties. 8 ° In addition, the state charged that
Goins committed the crime with sexual motivation. 8' The trial court
instructed the jury that to convict Goins, it must find beyond a reasonable
doubt "[t]hat the assault was committed with intent to commit Indecent
Liberties."' 82 The court defined indecent liberties as occurring when a
person "knowingly causes another person who is not his spouse to have
sexual contact with him or another by forcible compulsion."' 83 "Sexual
contact" was defined as "any touching of the sexual or other intimate
171. State v. Goins, 113 Wash. App. 723, 725-26, 54 P.3d 723, 724 (2002).
172. Id. at 726, 54 P.3d at 724-25.
173. Id. at 726, 54 P.3d at 724.
174. Id. at 726, 54 P.3d at 724-25.
175. Id. at 726, 54 P.3d at 725.
176. Id. at 726-27, 54 P.3d at 725.




181. Id. at 727-28, 54 P.3d at 725.
182. Id. at 728, 54 P.3d at 725.
183. Id.
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parts of a person done for the purpose of gratifying sexual desire of
either party."'
18 4
The trial court judge also gave the jury a special verdict form that
asked if the crime was committed with sexual motivation, pursuant to
Revised Code of Washington section 9.94A.835. 85 The court instructed
the jury that "[s]exual motivation means that one of the purposes for
which the defendant committed the crime was for the purpose of his or
her sexual gratification."'86 Although the jury convicted Goins of second-
degree assault with intent to commit indecent liberties, it acquitted him
of committing the crime with sexual motivation.'87
Division I of the Washington State Court of Appeals noted that "the
verdicts [were] irreconcilably inconsistent because Goins either
committed the assault for the purpose of sexual gratification or he did
not.""'8 Enumerating the three contexts in which inconsistent verdicts can
arise involving a single defendant,"'9 the Goins court identified the case
as one where a guilty verdict on one charge is inconsistent with a special
verdict on the same charge. 9 ' Thus, Goins argued that the Hurley and
Wedner cases governed the facts of his case, mandating a mistrial."' The
court acknowledged the Hurley and Wedner cases and noted that "[u]ntil
quite recently, it appeared to be settled law in Washington that, where the
jury returns a general verdict of guilt accompanied by an irreconcilably
inconsistent special interrogatory on the same charge, the remedy is to
declare the inconsistent verdicts void and remand for a new trial.""'2
The court reasoned, however, that the Washington State Supreme
Court's decisions in Ng and McNeal demonstrated an adoption of the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Powell, expanding judicial acceptance
184. Id.
185. Id. See also supra Part I.B.
186. Goins, 113 Wash. App. at 728, 54 P.3d at 725-26.
187. Id. at 729, 54 P.3d at 726.
188. Id. at 730, 54 P.3d at 726.
189. Id. at 730-32, 54 P.3d at 726-27.
190. Id. at 732, 54 P.3d at 727.
191. Id. at 736, 54 P.3d at 729. Goins also claimed that Revised Code of Washington section
4.44.440 mandated that the special verdict controlled and therefore that his conviction was void. Id.
The court found that Revised Code of Washington section 4.44.440 does not apply to the criminal
context. Id. See infra Part IV for a summary of the Goins court's response to this argument. Finally,
Goins claimed that his counsel was ineffective in not preserving his right to appeal the inconsistent
verdicts. Goins, 113 Wash. App. at 743, 54 P.3d at 733. The court dismissed this argument by
showing that Goins' counsel might have strategically refrained from objecting to the inconsistent
verdicts. Id. at 744, 54 P.3d at 733.
192. Goins, 113 Wash. App. at 732, 54 P.3d at 727.
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of inconsistent verdicts.'93 The Goins court suggested that the Hurley and
Wedner decisions may have been implicitly overruled by this
acceptance.' 94 With Hurley and Wedner called into question, the Goins
court extended the Ng and McNeal decisions, holding that in the single-
defendant context "where the inconsistency is between the general
verdict and a special verdict relating to that same count, the general
verdict will stand if it is supported by substantial evidence."' 95
Although Goins argued that the McNeal decision applied only to
multiple-count inconsistent verdicts,'96 the court disagreed and reasoned
that the McNeal decision extended the Ng rule to inconsistencies between
a special and a general verdict in any context."9' The Goins court's
decision to extend the doctrine was based on several earlier cases,' 98
including Peerson.'9 9 The Goins court cited the McNeal court's reliance
on Peerson for the proposition that sufficiency of the evidence review
was applicable to inconsistencies between special and general verdicts.2"'
The Goins court noted that on appeal, the prosecution argued that
Peerson supported the proposition that inconsistent verdicts in any
context must stand when sufficient evidence supports the guilty
verdict.2"' Without passing judgment on the prosecution's argument, the
Goins court recognized that the Hurley and Wedner decisions were based
on the concern that a special verdict that was inconsistent with a general
verdict on a single count cast doubt on whether the state had proved its
case beyond a reasonable doubt.0 2 But, ultimately, the Goins court
concluded that voiding Goins' conviction in light of the decision to
uphold inconsistent verdicts in Ng, McNeal, and Peerson would be "to
elevate form over substance.""2 3 Consequently, the court applied the
193. Id. at 734, 54 P.3d at 728.
194. Id. at 735, 54 P.3d at 729. See supra notes 165-70 and accompanying text.
195. Goins, 113 Wash. App. at 742, 54 P.3d at 733. Although the Goins court used the terms
"substantial evidence" rather than "sufficient evidence," it seems to have used "substantial" in the
same way as the Ng and McNeal courts used "sufficient." The Goins court did not distinguish
between the two terms, or note the discrepancy.
196. Id. at 736, 54 P.3d at 729.
197. Id. at 741-42, 54 P.3d at 732.
198. The Goins court also relied on State v. Barnes, 85 Wash. App. 638, 932 P.2d 669 (1997),
State v. Burke, 90 Wash. App. 378, 952 P.2d 619 (1998), and State v. Holmes, 106 Wash. App. 775,
24 P.3d 1118 (2001). Goins, 113 Wash. App. at 734-36, 54 P.3d at 728-29.
199. Goins, 113 Wash. App. at 741-42, 54 P.3d at 732.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 740-41, 54 P.3d at 732.
202. Id. at 742, 54 P.3d at 732.
203. Id. at 742, 54 P.3d at 732-33.
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same standard of review and held that there was substantial evidence to
support the guilty verdict.t 4
Judge Ellington dissented to the extension of Ng, McNeal, and
Peerson to the context of single-count, single-defendant inconsistent
verdicts. 0 5 Citing the policy and language of Powell, she agreed with the
majority that where two general verdicts are inconsistent, considering the
sufficiency of evidence is a valid and adequate remedy.26 However, she
argued that "lenity offers no explanation for an inconsistent special
verdict on the same count., 207 In this context, she added, "the integrity of
the general verdict is called into question. 2 0' 8 Thus, Judge Ellington
would not apply a rule that arose from inconsistencies in different counts
to cases where the inconsistency was within a single count.29 Thus,
Judge Ellington recommended remanding the conviction for retrial.10
IV. WASHINGTON'S CRIMINAL COURT RULES AND CIVIL
CODE FAIL TO RESOLVE IRRECONCILABLY
INCONSISTENT CRIMINAL VERDICTS
Washington has a criminal court rule acknowledging the issue of
inconsistencies between special and general verdicts in criminal trials.21
However, this rule does not provide a solution in the case of
irreconcilably inconsistent verdicts because it only allows the judge to
ask the jury to deliberate further.21 2 In addition, the Washington statute
giving preference to special verdicts over the general verdicts in civil
trials 213 fails to resolve the issue in criminal trials.214 Consequently,
Washington's court rules and code leave the issue of irreconcilably
inconsistent verdicts in criminal trials unresolved.
Washington Superior Court Criminal Rule 6.16(b), promulgated by
the Washington State Supreme Court, acknowledges that inconsistencies
between general and special criminal verdicts exist. The rule provides
204. Id. at 743, 54 P.3d at 733.






211. WASH. SUP. CT. CRIM. R. 6.16(b).
212. Id.
213. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.44.440 (2002).
214. Goins, 113 Wash. App. at 740,54 P.3d at 732.
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that "[w]hen a special finding is inconsistent with another special finding
or with the general verdict, the court may order the jury to retire for
further consideration.2"5 However, the rule fails to identify appropriate
judicial action if the jury is unable to reconcile the two verdicts. Thus,
the court rules fail to resolve the issue of irreconcilably inconsistent
criminal verdicts.
The Revised Code of Washington section 4.44.440 (section 4.44.440)
provides a statutory remedy for inconsistent civil verdicts in Washington.
Under section 4.44.440, "[w]hen a special finding of facts shall be
inconsistent with the general verdict, the former shall control the latter,
and the court shall give judgment accordingly."'21 6 Consequently, in civil
cases involving inconsistent verdicts, Washington judges are instructed
to enforce the jury's special verdict and not the general verdict. Although
section 4.44.440 is located in the title on civil procedure, if it was applied
to a criminal case, it would render the general verdict void when the
general verdict directly contradicted the special verdict.
The Goins court held that section 4.44.440 does not apply in the
criminal context.2t 7 Until Goins, Washington courts had not determined
whether section 4.44.440 applied to criminal proceedings. Although two
appellate courts had been confronted with the issue, neither had ruled on
the issue. 2"8 The Goins court conceded that if section 4.44.440 applied
the defendant's conviction would be overturned. 2'9 Then, the court
reasoned that section 4.44.440 did not apply because it is in the civil
procedure title of the Revised Code of Washington,20 and no case law
had held that it applies in the criminal context. 22' The court further noted
that under prior Washington law, the remedy for single-count, single-
defendant inconsistent verdicts was a mistrial, not an acquittal, as section
4.44.440 would direct.222 Therefore, the Goins court held that section
4.44.440 does not apply to criminal proceedings.223
215. WASH. SUP. CT. CRIM. R. 6.16(b).
216. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.44.440.
217. Goins, 113 Wash. App. at 740, 54 P.3d at 732.
218. See State v. Robinson, 84 Wash. 2d 42, 43-45, 523 P.2d 1192, 1194-95 (1974); State v.
Kimball, 14 Wash. App. 951, 955, 546 P.2d 1217, 1219-20 (1976).
219. Goins, 113 Wash. App. at 736, 54 P.3d at 729-30.
220. Id. at 736, 54 P.3d at 730.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 739, 54 P.3d at 73 1.
223. Id. at 740, 54 P.3d at 732.
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In sum, while the Washington State Legislature has addressed the
inconsistent verdict issue in the civil context in section 4.44.440,
indicating that the special verdict controls over the general verdict when
the two are inconsistent, it has not specifically addressed the issue in the
criminal context. Further, the Goins court has held that section 4.44.440
does not apply to criminal trials. The Washington criminal court rule
allowing the court to send the jury back for further deliberation does not
clarify the appropriate judicial action if the jury remains unable to return
a consistent verdict. Thus, neither section 4.44.440 nor the Washington
court rules resolve the issue of irreconcilably inconsistent criminal
verdicts.
V. THE GOINS DECISION IS FLAWED BECAUSE THE COURT
FAILED TO FOLLOW PRECEDENT AND EXTENDED
INAPPOSITE CASE LAW BEYOND ITS CONSTITUTIONAL
REACH
The majority decision in Goins is flawed for three reasons. First, the
court did not follow the Hurley and Wedner cases, which were directly
on point and binding.224 Second, the court extended Ng and McNeal to
the single-count, single-defendant context, where these cases do not
apply.225 Third, by extending Ng and McNeal to this context, the court
reached a conclusion that violates the Due Process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment by allowing a conviction to stand when an
element of the charged crime has not been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.226
If the court had properly followed Hurley and Wedner, it would have
reached a constitutional result. The Washington State Supreme Court
should reverse the Goins decision and apply Hurley and Wedner to the
single-count, single-defendant inconsistent verdict context. The court
should also modify its existing criminal court rule to provide a remedy
when the jury provides an irreconcilably inconsistent verdict in the
single-count, single-defendant context. If the court fails to provide a
remedy, the legislature should act to prevent this unconstitutional result
from recurring. The legislature should adopt a criminal statute
specifically applying to single-count, single-defendant inconsistent
224. See infra Part V.A.
225. See infra Part V.B.
226. See infra Part V.C.
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verdicts mandating at least a mistrial, and at most an acquittal, if the
inconsistency cannot be resolved.
A. The Goins Court Should Have Applied Hurley and Wedner, Which
Were Directly on Point and Had Not Been Overruled
The Hurley and Wedner decisions are directly on point, and mandated
a mistrial in Goins. All three cases involved an inconsistent special
verdict and general verdict on the same count. In Hurley, the special
verdict finding that the defendant was not armed negated an element of
robbery.227 Similarly, in Wedner, the special verdict finding that the
defendant was not armed negated an element of second-degree assault. 28
In Goins, the special verdict finding that there was no sexual motivation
negated an element of second-degree assault with intent to commit
indecent liberties.2 29 Thus, in all three cases the special verdict was
irreconcilably inconsistent with the guilty general verdict because the
special verdict negated one of the elements of the crime. The trial courts'
resolution in Hurley and Wedner was to grant each defendant a
mistrial. 230 Because the Hurley and Wedner decisions are directly on
point, the Goins court should also have granted the defendant a mistrial.
At the time Division I of the Washington State Court of Appeals heard
Goins, the Hurley and Wedner decisions had not been overturned. The
Goins appellate court conceded that "until recently," the Hurley and
Wedner decisions controlled where the jury returned a guilty general
verdict with an irreconcilably inconsistent special verdict on the same
charge, directing a new trial. 23' The court reasoned that the Hurley and
Wedner decisions were called into doubt by recent cases, citing Ng,
McNeal, State v. Barnes,232 Burke, and Holmes. 233 However, none of
these cases arose in the same context as the Hurley or Wedner cases. The
Ng case involved an inconsistency between an acquittal and a
conviction, 234 not an internal inconsistency between a general and special
227. See supra Part 11.C.3.
228. See supra Part II.C.3.
229. State v. Goins, 113 Wash. App. 723,730, 54 P.3d 723, 726 (2002).
230. State v. Hurley, 4 Wash. App. 781, 784, 483 P.2d 1274, 1276 (1971); State v. Wedner, 24
Wash. App. 346, 348, 601 P.2d 950, 951 (1979).
231. Goins, 113 Wash. App. at 732, 54 P.3d at 727.
232. 85 Wash. App. 638, 932 P.2d 669 (1997).
233. Goins, 113 Wash. App. at 732-35, 54 P.3d at 727-29.
234. State v. Ng, 110 Wash. 2d 32, 48, 750 P.2d 632, 640 (1988).
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verdict on the same count. The McNeal case involved an inconsistency
between a conviction and an inconsistent special verdict on a different
count235-again, not an inconsistency between verdicts on the same
count. The Barnes court addressed the procedural right to raise the issue
of an inconsistent verdict on appeal if no objection was made at trial, not
the substantive right to a new trial in the face of an internally inconsistent
verdict.2 36 The Burke court also addressed this procedural issue, then
proceeded to reconcile the verdicts while approvingly citing Wedner.
2 37
Finally, the Holmes court was also able to reconcile the potentially
inconsistent verdicts because of different ways the jury instructions could
be interpreted.2 38 Although the Holmes court went on to question the
continuing vitality of the Hurley and Wedner cases, it questioned the
cases based on the Ng decision.2 39 But, Ng did not involve an internal
inconsistency between verdicts on the same count,24 and therefore did
not arise in the same context as the Hurley or Wedner cases.
In sum, the Hurley and Wedner decisions are directly on point in the
single-count, single-defendant Goins context. If the appellate court had
correctly applied Hurley and Wedner, it would have reversed Goins'
conviction. At the time of the Goins decision, the rule pronounced by
Hurley and Wedner had not been overruled. Although the Goins court
noted that some doubt existed as to the Hurley and Wedner decisions'
continuing authority, none of the cases it cited implicitly or explicitly
overruled either the Hurley or the Wedner decision. Therefore, the
Hurley and Wedner decisions controlled in the Goins single-count,
single-defendant inconsistent verdict context, and the Goins court erred
in not adhering to precedent.
B. The Goins Court Erred by Extending Inapposite Case Law
There is a fundamental difference between irreconcilable
inconsistencies between a general and special verdict in the single-count,
single-defendant context, such as in Goins, and inconsistencies in any
other context. In the single-count, single-defendant context, a special
verdict can be irreconcilably inconsistent with the general verdict only
235. State v. McNeal, 145 Wash. 2d 352, 357, 37 P.3d 280, 282 (2002).
236. Barnes, 85 Wash. App. at 668, 932 P.2d at 686.
237. State v. Burke, 90 Wash. App. 378, 386-88, 952 P.2d 619, 622-24 (1998).
238. State v. Holmes, 106 Wash. App. 775, 779-80, 24 P.3d 1118, 1121 (2001).
239. Id. at 781 n.2, 24 P.3d at 1122 n.2.
240. State v. Ng, 110 Wash. 2d 32, 48, 750 P.2d 632, 640 (1988).
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when the special verdict finding negates an element of the crime asserted
by the general verdict. In any other inconsistent verdict context, such as
inconsistencies between verdicts on different counts or different
defendants, the existence of an inconsistent verdict does not per se negate
an element of the crime charged.
The Goins court's reliance on Ng and MeNeal as precedent to justify
acceptance of inconsistencies in the single-count, single-defendant
context is misplaced because the Ng and McNeal decisions applied to
different contexts. The Ng decision upheld an inconsistency between
multiple convictions and acquittals on multiple counts.24" ' The McNeal
court upheld an inconsistency between a special verdict on one count and
a conviction on another count.242 In both of these cases, the
inconsistencies were between verdicts on multiple counts. In contrast, the
Goins case involved internally inconsistent verdicts on a single count.243
Neither the Ng nor the McNeal decision involved an internal
inconsistency on the same count. Because of the fundamental difference
between internally inconsistent verdicts and inconsistent verdicts in any
other contexts, neither the Ng nor the McNeal decision should control the
outcome in the single-count, single-defendant inconsistent verdict
context.
The mere existence of a logical inconsistency in all three cases does
not justify upholding Goins' conviction. The Goins court conceded that
Goins logically could not have committed the assault both with and
244without sexual motivation, 2  but noted that logically similar
inconsistencies existed in Ng and McNeal.245 The court concluded that
because all three cases contained logical inconsistencies, the resolution
of each should be the same.246 However, the rationale behind Ng and
McNeal does not transfer to the Goins context because the Ng and
McNeal cases, unlike the Goins case, involved inconsistent verdicts on
more than one count.247 In Goins, an inconsistent special verdict negated
241. Id.
242. State v. McNeal, 145 Wash. 2d 352,359, 37 P.3d 280, 283 (2002).
243. State v. Goins, 113 Wash. App. 723, 728, 54 P.3d 723, 725 (2002).
244. Id. at 730, 54 P.3d at 726.
245. As the Goins court noted, in McNeal, the defendant could not simultaneously have been and
not been under the influence of drugs, and in Ng, the defendant could not simultaneously have been
guilty of armed robbery and not guilty of felony-murder. Id. at 742, 54 P.3d at 732.
246. Id. at 742, 54 P.3d at 732-33.
247. State v. Ng, 110 Wash. 2d 32, 45, 750 P.2d 632, 639 (1988); McNeal, 145 Wash. 2d at 357,
37 P.3d at 282.
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an element of the same crime on the same count on which the general
verdict found the defendant guilty.248 Neither the Ng nor the McNeal
court dealt with this context.
Further, concerns of jury lenity do not justify extending the Ng and
McNeal holdings to the single-count, single-defendant context. In Ng, the
court found that because the verdicts were a mixture of convictions and
acquittals, jury lenity might have played an important role. 249 In McNeal,
the court found a possible showing of jury lenity in the inconsistent
verdicts, noting first that a consistent special verdict would have
increased the defendant's standard sentence range, 250 and also that the
jury might have tried to find the defendant guilty on a basis that they
thought would imply less culpability.25' In a footnote to its opinion, the
Goins court commented that had the jury specially found that Goins had
a sexual motivation, he would have been subject to sexual offender
registration requirements.252 Thus, it is possible to argue that the jury was
exercising lenity by refusing to specially find sexual motivation.
However, this is unlikely because when the jury specifically asked the
court about the purpose of the special verdict form, the court gave no
explanation. 53 Therefore, the jury was most likely unaware of the
consequences of the special finding. In both Ng and McNeal, the record
did not indicate whether the jury was aware of the punitive consequences
of its findings. Because the record was silent, the court could reasonably
assume that the Ng and McNeal juries were aware of the punitive
consequences, and could therefore attribute its inconsistent findings to
considerations of jury lenity. But, when a court like the one in Goins
knows that the jury was probably unaware that its verdict might mitigate
the defendant's punishment, it would be disingenuous to resolve the
inconsistency by assuming it was caused by jury lenity.
Finally, the Peerson case does not support the proposition that
inconsistencies in the single-count context should be treated in the same
manner as inconsistencies in the multiple-count context. The Goins court
noted that the Peerson decision provided an example of a case upholding
inconsistencies between a special and a general verdict. 54 But the
248. Goins, 113 Wash. App. at 729, 54 P.3d at 726.
249. Ng, 110 Wash. 2d at 48, 750 P.2d at 640.
250. McNeal, 145 Wash. 2d at 359 n.3, 37 P.3d at 284 n.3.
251. Id. at 361,37 P.3d at 285.
252. Goins, 113 Wash. App. at 728 n. 1, 54 P.3d at 725 n. 1.
253. Id. at 729, 54 P.3d at 726.
254. Id. at 741-42, 54 P.3d at 732 (citing McNeal, 145 Wash. 2d at 359, 37 P.3d at 283-84).
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comparison to the Peerson decision is inapposite. The Peerson court
actually reconciled the verdicts through liberal construction.255 Further,
the alleged inconsistency in Peerson arose between a special verdict on
one count and the general verdict on a second count.256 Therefore, the
Peerson case neither presented irreconcilably inconsistent verdicts, as
did the Goins case, nor considered the single-count context, as did the
Goins case.
In sum, the Ng and McNeal cases present a rule that is inapplicable to
the single-count, single-defendant context of Goins. The multiple-count
context in which the Ng and McNeal decisions arose is fundamentally
different from the single-count context. The mere existence of a logical
inconsistency between the verdicts in all three cases does not justify
extending the rationale of the Ng and McNeal cases to the single-count
context. Furthermore, considerations of jury lenity underpinning the
rationale in both Ng and McNeal are not present in Goins. The Goins
court's reliance on Peerson is also misplaced because that case fails to
provide any support for the contention that inconsistent verdicts should
be treated alike regardless of the context in which they arise. Therefore,
there is no basis on which to extend the rationale and rule of Ng or
McNeal to Goins.
C. The Goins Decision Unconstitutionally Allows a Conviction to
Stand When All the Elements of a Crime Have Not Been Proven
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
The state failed to meet its constitutionally mandated burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt in Goins. As the U.S. Supreme Court held in
Winship, the state must prove every element of a crime charged beyond a
reasonable doubt.257 In Goins, one of the elements to be proven was that
the assault was committed with intent to commit indecent liberties.258
"Indecent liberties" is committed when one person forces another to have
sexual contact.259 Intent to commit indecent liberties, therefore, is an
intent to force such sexual contact. As the Goins majority conceded, this
is a sexually motivated crime. 260 Thus, sexual motivation is an element of
255. State v. Peerson, 62 Wash. App. 755, 766, 816 P.2d 43, 50 (1992).
256. Id. at 765, 816 P.2d at 50.
257. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
258. Goins, 113 Wash. App. at 728, 54 P.3d at 725.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 729-30, 54 P.3d at 726.
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the assault charge in the Goins case. Yet, when the jury in Goins was
asked whether the defendant committed the assault with sexual
motivation, it answered that he did not.262 Therefore, not only did the
state not prove that the defendant was sexually motivated, the jury
explicitly found that the state had failed to meet its burden of proof.
Despite this finding, the jury convicted Goins of the assault. 263 Under
Winship, Goins' conviction was void, because a finding of sexual
motivation was necessary to prove the crime charged.
Permitting Goins' conviction to stand violates the constitutional
requirement that the state must prove every element of the crime charged
beyond a reasonable doubt.2" The Goins decision extends the acceptance
of inconsistent verdicts265 beyond its constitutionally permissible reach.
Before Goins, Washington courts reversed convictions when the jury in
effect informed the court, through an inconsistent special verdict on the
same crime on which it convicted the defendant, that it did not believe
that the state had proven all elements of the crime charged beyond a
reasonable doubt.2 66 In fact, several earlier cases upholding inconsistent
verdicts in other contexts specifically noted that the inconsistent finding
was not an element of the offense charged. 67 In Goins, however, the
court upheld a jury verdict despite the jury's effective statement that the
state had not met its burden of proof.268 Once it is clear, as it was in
Goins, that the standard of proof has not been met, conviction is
unconstitutional. Although easier to apply, sufficiency of the evidence
review standard is inapposite when the state has failed to prove every
element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
The constitutional guarantee of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
outweighs policy justifications for jury lenity. The U.S. Supreme Court
261. Id. at 728, 54 P.3d at 725.
262. Id. at 729, 54 P.3d at 726.
263. Id.
264. h7 re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
265. There is arguably cause to be concerned about the collective reasoning of the U.S. Supreme
Court and Washington State Supreme Court on the topic of inconsistent verdicts in general. See
Muller, supra note 88, at 794-820 (discussing the inadequacy of the current response to inconsistent
verdicts).
266. State v. Wedner, 24 Wash. App. 346, 348, 601 P.2d 950, 951 (1979); State v. Hurley, 4
Wash. App. 781, 784, 483 P.2d 1274, 1276 (1971). As noted, the Holmes court questioned the
continuing vitality of the Hurley and Wedner decisions, but did so in dicta. See supra Part II.C.3.
267. State v. Burke, 90 Wash. App. 378, 388, 952 P.2d 619, 623 (1998); State v. Baruso, 72
Wash. App. 603, 617, 865 P.2d at 512, 519 (1993); State v. Kimball, 14 Wash. App. 951, 955, 546
P.2d 1217, 1220 (1976).
268. Goins, 113 Wash. App. at 744, 54 P.3d at 734.
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in Powell upheld jury lenity as an exercise of the jury's power to check
the exercise of the executive power.269 Both the Ng and McNeal decisions
relied on the reasoning of Powell to support the strong policy favoring
the exercise of jury lenity."' 0 However, while the jury can refuse to
convict a defendant despite the production of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant is guilty by exercising lenity, allowing the jury
to convict when the state has failed to meet its burden of proof violates
due process. Because the Goins jury could not agree beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant was sexually motivated, its conviction is
unconstitutional. Internally inconsistent verdicts arising in the single-
count, single-defendant context are distinct from those in other contexts.
The jury cannot constitutionally convict a defendant in spite of the state's
failure to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt-to allow such
convictions in the name of jury lenity is nonsensical. No amount of
respect for the jury's power to be lenient justifies depriving the defendant
of liberty by convicting the defendant on proof that is less than what is
constitutionally required.
D. Either the Washington State Supreme Court or the Washington
State Legislature Should Provide a Remedy to Address the
Concerns Raised by the Goins Decision
The Washington State Supreme Court should strike down the Goins
decision and reaffirm the Hurley and Wedner decisions by granting the
defendant a mistrial. The court should do this because the Goins decision
violated the defendant's due process right to be convicted by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. However, it could be further argued that in
cases such as Goins, allowing a mistrial where the jury has exposed the
state's failure to meet its burden of proof could violate the Double
Jeopardy clause which prevents the state from retrying the defendant for
the same crime. If this is true, then the remedy would be acquittal rather
than mistrial. Prior to the Goins decision, Washington law directed a
mistrial, not an acquittal, as the remedy for single-count, single-
defendant inconsistent verdicts. 27 ' The Hurley court addressed this issue
directly: "we do not find [the] defendant entitled to a judgment
269. United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65 (1984).
270. State v. McNeal, 145 Wash. 2d 352, 358, 37 P.3d 280, 283 (2002); State v. Ng, 110 Wash.
2d 32, 46, 750 P.2d 632, 639 (1988).
271. Wedner, 24 Wash. App. at 348, 601 P.2d at 951; Hurley, 4 Wash. App. at 784, 483 P.2d at
1276.
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notwithstanding the verdict [an acquittal]. The verdict was void .... The
posture of the case was the same as if the jury had returned no verdict at
all and a mistrial had been declared. Hence, the judgment and sentence
was a nullity. 2 72 In overruling the Goins decision, the court should
affirm the Hurley and Wedner cases, and grant the defendant at the least
a mistrial, and at the most an acquittal.
Further, the Washington State Supreme Court should modify the
criminal court rules to provide at least a mistrial in the event that the jury
cannot provide consistent verdicts in the single-count, single-defendant
context. The court should do this in order to clarify the law and prevent
recurrence of the due process violation found in the Goins decision. A
modified criminal rule could read in relevant part (with additions
underlined):
When a special verdict is irreconcilably inconsistent with another
special verdict or with the general verdict, the court may order the
jury to retire for further consideration. If the jury is unable to return
a consistent verdict in the single-count, single-defendant context,
the court shall declare a mistrial ror enter a judgment of acquittal].
Adopting such a court rule would provide trial courts with guidance and
preserve defendants' constitutional rights.
If the Washington State Supreme Court fails to provide a remedy for
this violation, the Washington State Legislature should promulgate a
statute to correct this unconstitutional result. Although Revised Code of
Washington section 4.44.440 is inapplicable to the criminal context,
73
the statute provides a good framework for a parallel criminal statute. The
proposed criminal statute should have language with an effect similar to
that of the proposed criminal court rule.
VI. CONCLUSION
Division I of the Washington State Court of Appeals wrongly upheld
the conviction in Goins. As a result, the defendant in Goins was denied
his liberty even though the state failed to meet its constitutionally
required burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Goins court
overturned precedent that would have granted him a mistrial and instead
applied inapposite case law involving inconsistent verdicts in different
contexts under the justification of jury lenity. However, jury lenity
272. Hurley, 4 Wash. App. at 783-84, 483 P.2d at 1275-76 (internal citations omitted).
273. See supra Part IV.
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considerations are absent in the Goins case, and even if they existed they
would be trumped by the defendant's due process rights. The
Washington State Supreme Court should reverse the decision in Goins.
Further, the court should modify the criminal court rule to reflect a
remedy of at least a mistrial and at most an acquittal in the single-count,
single-defendant context. If the court fails to reverse the Goins decision
and modify the criminal court rules to uphold the defendant's
constitutional rights, then the Washington State Legislature should
intervene and promulgate a statute to that end.
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